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Background: Statistical significance is an important concept in empirical science. However the meaning of the
term varies widely. We investigate into the intuitive understanding of the notion of significance.
Methods: We described the results of two different experiments published in a major psychological journal to a
sample of students of psychology, labeling the findings as ‘significant’ versus ‘non-significant.’ Participants were
asked to estimate the effect sizes and sample sizes of the original studies.
Results: Labeling the results of a study as significant was associated with estimations of a big effect, but was largely
unrelated to sample size. Similarly, non-significant results were estimated as near zero in effect size.
Conclusions: After considerable training in statistics, students largely equate statistical significance with medium to
large effect sizes, rather than with large sample sizes. The data show that students assume that statistical significance is
due to real effects, rather than to ‘statistical tricks’ (e.g., increasing sample size).
Keywords: Statistical significance, Practical significance, Effect size, NHST, Sample sizeBackground
There is continuing debate on the usefulness and validity
of the method of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
(NHST, e.g., [1-3]). Several journals edited special issues
on this topic (e.g., Journal of Experimental Education in
1993; Psychological Science in 1997; Research in the
Schools in 1998) that culminated in the question: What is
beyond the significance test ritual (Journal of Psychology
in 2009)?
The debate has led to an increased awareness of the
problems associated with NHST, and these problems are
linked to what has been referred to as a ‘crisis of confi-
dence’ [4]. Among the dominant recommendations for
NHST is reporting of effect size as a supplement to the
p value [5]. Accordingly, not only the statistical signifi-
cance of a result should be valued but also the effect size
of the study (e.g., [1,6-12]). This should prevent readers
from holding the false belief that significant results are
automatically big and important, or otherwise, that not
significant means ‘no effect at all’. Although these mis-
conceptions, that significance means big, and non-
significance means no effect, are often referred to in the
literature (e.g., [3,13-17]) their empirical basis is weak.* Correspondence: Anton.kuehberger@sbg.ac.at
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unless otherwise stated.This is clearly in conflict with the demand for evidence
based practice in statistics and statistics education [18].
Thus, the purpose of the present study was to investigate
the prevalence of these misconceptions.
Statistical and practical significance
The distinction between statistical and practical signifi-
cance is quite old. The origin of statistical significance
can be traced back to the 1700s [19]. Practical significance,
expressed as the strength of the relationship between two
variables, can roughly be dated back to the 18th century
[20]. Modern statistical significance refers to the p value
as the result of a significance test. If p < .05 a result is
statistically significant. This notion of statistical significance
became popular in the social sciences in the first half of the
20th century mainly due to the work of Sir Ronald Fisher
[21,22]. With the rise of the statistical significance test, the
concept of effect magnitude became seemingly dispensable.
Only recently, there is an opposite trend and many au-
thors pointed to the importance of reporting the mag-
nitude of the effect under investigation, mostly because
statistical tests are so heavily influenced by sample size
(e.g. [6,23-32]). Recall that a test statistic is the product
of sample size and effect size [16,33]. The p value, as a
common-language translation of the various test statistics
[8], is therefore also a function of practical significance
and sample size, in short: p = f (ES, N). If the effect is smalltral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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tically significant. Similarly, if the effect size is large and
the sample size small, the p value will also be significant.
Thus, given a big enough sample, even trivial effects can
be statistically significant [34]. A correct interpretation of
the significance test therefore requires taking the relation-
ship between sample size and effect size into account [35].
Consider the classic aspirin textbook example in Rosnow
and Rosenthal [36]: A study tested the effect of aspirin on
reducing heart attacks. 11.034 men were given an aspirin
pill to be taken every 2 days, whereas 11.037 other men
were given a placebo. Statistically speaking, the treatment
was enormously effective (p < .000001). It was so effective
that it was decided to end the study prematurely because
the outcome was clear and it appeared unethical to deprive
the participants of the control group of the beneficial
aspirin [37]. Here statistical significance was equated with
practical significance. However, the treatment was far from
being effective in terms of effect size (r2 = .0011): statistical
and practical significance can tell different stories.
The failure to distinguish between statistical and prac-
tical significance has been called the significance fallacy
[17]. It comes in two varieties. The first variety is to
equate a low p value with a big effect size. Thus, the nu-
meric value of p is considered as an indicator of the strength
of the treatment effect under test, or the distance between
the groups that are compared. Kline [16] called this the
magnitude fallacy. The second variety of not distinguishing
between statistical and practical significance is that sta-
tistically non-significant results are interpreted as evi-
dence of no effect, as ‘no difference between means’, or
as ‘no relationship between variables’. We call this the
nullification fallacy.
The nullification fallacy has the potential to damage
science (and lives), as an example taken from Fidler
(Fidler F: From statistical significance to effect size esti-
mation: statistical reform in psychology, medicine and
ecology. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Melbourne,
2006) shows: in ecology, mark-and-recapture studies are
used to determine population sizes. To identify individual
frogs upon recapture researchers used to clip certain
combinations of toes in order to spare the sensitive skin
of the animals, since some studies investigating whether
toe-clipping had an impact on the frog’s survival rates
found no significant effects. But when Parris and Mc-
Carthy [38] reanalysed the evidence they found that
toe-clipping did actually decrease the survival rate by
6–18% with each toe clipped. The sample sizes of the
original studies were just too low to (statistically) show
the effect. In this example, the consequence of misin-
terpreting a non-significant result as indicating that
there is no effect is obvious. Other researchers have
heatedly argued about the negative consequences of un-
critically using underpowered studies to declare thenull hypothesis true (for animal studies see [39]; for
Neuroscience, see [40]).
Previous research
It is difficult to estimate how common these fallacies
about statistical and practical significance are, although
these misconceptions are discussed in virtually every
article reviewing NHST (e.g. [3,13-17]). Among the first
experimenters to examine the level of p < .05 were
Rosenthal and Gaito [41,42], who found an abrupt drop
in confidence in a p level just above .05. Nelson et al.
[43] later found this cliff effect in a survey on psycho-
logical researchers. Again and again the magical nature
of p < .05 has been shown (e.g., [44]), with some authors
proposing strategies for adjusting effect size estimates
taking the publication bias into account (e.g., [45,46]).
More recent research investigated the consequences of
the cliff effect with an eye on the unhealthy effect of
small (i.e., underpowered) - however significant – studies
for psychological research in general (e.g., [47,48]).
Among the range of studies discussing the consequences
of NHST, two empirical studies investigated intuitions
about the relationship between effect size, sample size
and p. Oakes [49] asked academic psychologists to estimate
the unstandardized effect size for a given Student’s t-test
example. Oakes prescribed the p value and sample size
and had participants estimate the size of the effect (see
Figure 1). He found that the effect size was generally
overestimated. In addition, for identical sample sizes, par-
ticipants understood that the effect size associated with a
p value of .01 is bigger than the effect size associated with
a p value of .05. The increase in effect size for p = .01 is
normatively correct, but participants overstated it consid-
erably. That is, as the p decreased the effect size was as-
sumed to increase disproportionally. This can be seen as
an instance of the magnitude fallacy.
Wilkerson and Olson [35] investigated how graduate
students understand the relationship between effect size,
sample size, and errors of statistical inference by asking
which of two studies, one with a small and one with a
big sample size, provides better evidence when both are
statistically significant at p = .05. Only one out of 52 gradu-
ate students recognized that, given two different studies
reporting the same p value, the study with the smaller sam-
ple size indicates the larger effect. Missing the link between
sample size and effect size is also indicated in the legendary
hospital problem by Kahneman and Tversky [50], where
participants failed to recognize that a smaller hospital is
more likely to have an uneven portion of male vs. female
babies born than a large hospital.
In Figure 1 the studies of Oakes [49] and Wilkerson
and Olson [35] are schematically depicted, and the main
outcomes are reported. As can be seen, each study fo-
cused on a specific part of the relationship between effect
Figure 1 Overview of previous studies investigating the understanding of the relationship between effect size (ES), and sample size (N).
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parameter constant. Here we extended this design to in-
clude all three variables concurrently for understanding
the relationship between effect size, sample size and p in-
side the heads of our participants.
The present research
In the present research we examined whether students
associate statistical significance with practical significance,
as stated by the significance fallacy. We did this by testing
both aspects of the significance fallacy: the magnitude
fallacy and the nullification fallacy. According to the
magnitude fallacy statistically significant results will be
rated as having a higher effect size than non-significant
results; according to the nullification fallacy, non-
significant results will be rated as zero in effect size. In
essence, we investigated intuitions about effect sizes and
sample sizes in the context of p-values: is a significant
p value due to effect size or due to sample size?
Our procedure was as follows: we picked two published
studies and described the procedure and the aim of these
studies, including the main hypothesis and the dependent
measure. We also described whether or not the finding
was statistically significant. Note that we did not report
statistical measures such as sample size, means, or stand-
ard deviations; we rather had participants estimate these
measures. That is, we reported the interpretation of the
findings and had participants estimate the data. Statistical
inference goes usually the other direction, from data tointerpretation. In order to investigate intuitions about
data, reversing the inferential direction can lead to import-
ant insights. In particular, we compared participants’ esti-
mations in the significant vs. the non-significant condition.
In this way we were able to test whether people expect
the difference between statistical significant and non-
significant result in the effect size, the sample size, or both.
Methods
Participants and procedure
We sampled 214 students of psychology (156 females,
mean age = 23.5, SD = 6.81) from the University of
Salzburg enrolled in a statistics course as participants.
Sampling was done in different years, thus the sample
is of different cohorts whose statistics education is similar,
however. All participants were familiar with hypothesis
testing and with the concept of statistical inference due to
three previous statistics courses (each 3 hours/week). Stu-
dents participated during their regularly scheduled class
time. To ensure commitment participants were offered
the chance of winning 20 Euro. The prize was awarded to
the two students who came closest to the actual sample
size. Under Austrian law it is not necessary to seek formal
ethical approval for conducting this research.
Material and design
We selected two published studies from Psychological
Science: ‘Thermometer of social relations’ [51] and ‘Body
locomotion as regulatory process’ Koch et al. [52]. The
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ferent temperatures on social relations. It was tested
whether participants rated their social proximity to an-
other person as closer when holding a warm compared
to a cold beverage. Proximity was measured on a scale
ranging from 1 to 7. The ‘locomotion’-study addressed
the significance of the motor system in influencing cogni-
tive processes. It tested whether stepping backwards
enhances cognitive control, measured by a Stroop test,
in comparison to stepping forward. Reaction time in ms
was the outcome variable of interest. These two articles
were chosen because their main research question and
their main outcome variable are easily comprehensible.
Both studies used t-tests for the analysis.
Participants were presented a short description of each
study of approximately 150 words including research
question, method, design (i.e. between groups), and out-
come variable (see Appendix) Subsequently, participants
were asked to estimate the respective measures as they
would expect them to be reported in the results section
of the paper (i.e., sample sizes, means and standard devi-
ations of both groups, Cohen’s d [53]). All participants
were presented both studies consecutively, whereas one
was described as statistically significant and the other as
non-significant. Note that therefore participants did not
rate both, the significant and the non-significant condi-
tion of the same study. The sequence of the studies was
altered between groups. From the participants’ ratings we
computed an unstandardized effect size (mean difference,
calculated by subtracting the means of the two groups).
Results
An initial survey of the data indicated that some of our
participants were unable or unwilling to follow the in-
struction. To ensure adequate data quality we therefore
settled for a rigorous regime of data inclusion. In a first
step, in the thermometer-study 13 participants had to be
excluded because estimates were beyond the range of the
response scale. We then excluded participants with miss-
ing values in our main dependent variables (nthermo = 6;Table 1 Results for ‘thermometer’-study
Actuala ‘Significant’ (n = 53) ‘Non
N 33 76 50
M group1 5.12 2.70 3.50
M group2 4.13 4.05 4.00
Mdiff 0.99 2.00 1.00
SD group1 1.22 1.00 1.25
SD group2 1.41 8.00 10.00
Cohen’s d 0.78b 0.60 0.30
Note. aThe actual study reported a significant effect. Attempts to replicate the effec
have failed, however [54].
bCohen’s d = .78 is reported in the paper. Calculating effect size from means and
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/resources/effect_size_input.php results in dnlocomotion = 10), and participants showing signs of incon-
sistency between p level and condition, either by giving
p values larger than 1 (nthermo = 16; nlocomotion = 20), by
reporting significant p values in the non-significant
condition (nthermo = 25; nlocomotion = 23), or by providing
non-significant p values (p > .05) in the significant con-
dition (nthermo = 28; nlocomotion = 28). This led to a final
sample size of 127 participants in the thermometer sce-
nario, and 133 participants in the locomotion scenario.
In terms of power, we achieved a power larger than 0.80
to detect a difference between conditions of d = .50,
p < .05, one-sided test, in both scenarios.
The assumption of normal distribution was violated
for the mean difference ratings and for the sample size
ratings. In addition, several outliers were included in our
data. We therefore computed non-parametric analyses
(Mann–Whitney U-Tests) to assess differences between
the two conditions. The ratings of sample sizes, median
values, and standard deviations, as well as the resultant
unstandardized and standardized effect sizes are presented
in Tables 1 and 2 for the ‘thermometer’ and ‘locomotion’-
study, respectively. For every variable three values are
given: (i) the actual result as reported in Psychological
Science, (ii) the estimations of the participants in the
significant condition, and (iii) the estimations of the par-
ticipants in the non-significant condition. Due to non-
normality, we report medians for the two latter condi-
tions. We found neither effects of order of the scenarios
(z <-1.01, p > .30, r < .09) nor of the order of significant
and non-significant condition (z <-1.19, p > .23, r < −.10)
on our dependent variables and thus collapsed these con-
ditions in the further analysis.
Testing the magnitude fallacy
According to the magnitude fallacy, statistically significant
results will be rated as having a higher effect size than
non-significant results. Therefore we tested whether the
absolute unstandardized (Mdiff ), and the standardized ef-
fect size (Cohen’s d), were higher in the significant than in
the non-significant condition. We found that participants-significant’ (n = 73) (z-value) p-value Effect size
(z =-1.75) p = .08 r = -.15
(z =-5.27) p < .001 r = -.47
(z =-3.88) p < .001 r = -.34
t of temperature on social relations within the Many Labs Replication Project
standard deviations using the Campbell effect size calculator available at
= .75, 95% C.I = [0.05; 1.46].
Table 2 Results for ‘locomotion’-study
Actuala ‘Significant’ (n = 65) ‘Non-significant’ (n = 68) (z-value) p-value Effect size
N 38 60 50 (z =-0.90) p = .37 r = -.08
M group1 712 150 150
M group2 676 120 118
Mdiff 36 50 10 (z =-2.48) p = .013 r = -.21
SD group1 83 10 5
SD group2 95 8 5
Cohen’s d 0.79 0.70 0.20 (z =-4.16) p < .001 r = -.36
Note: a The actual study reported a significant effect.
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sures (Mdiff and Cohen’s d) higher than participants in the
non-significant condition. These findings were consistent
in both studies (‘thermometer’-study, for Mdiff: z =-5.27,
p < .001, r = −.47; for d: z =-3.88, p < .001, r = −.34; c.f.
Table 1; ‘locomotion’-study, for Mdiff: z =-2.48, p = .013,
r = −.21; for d: z =-4.16, p < .001, r = −.36; c.f. Table 2).
Note also that the effect size estimates in the significant
conditions were quite close to the actual data reported in
Psychological Science.
Inspection of Tables 1 and 2 shows that participants
rated the sample sizes in the significant conditions only
slightly larger than in the non-significant conditions. These
effects were small (r = −.15, and r = −.08, respectively), and
statistically non-significant in both studies. Interestingly,
the estimated sample sizes were consistently higher than
the sample size of the actual study, which was quite low,
however.
Another way to present the results is in terms of ratios
of the effect sizes and sample sizes between the significant
and non-significant condition of each study. The effect
sizes were in both studies rated higher in the significant
compared to the non-significant condition (Mdiff: 2 : 1 and
5 : 1; Cohen’s d: 2 : 1 and 3.5 : 1, for locomotion and
thermometer study, respectively). In contrast, sample sizesn.s.
very small (0.00 < d < 0.30)
small (0.30 < d < 0.50)
medium (0.50 < d < 0.80)



















Figure 2 Proportions of participants estimating the effect as very sm
0.80), or large (d > 0.80), for both studies.were rated only slightly higher in the significant condition
in the ‘thermometer’-study (1.5: 1) and similarly in the
‘locomotion’-study (1.2 : 1).Testing the nullification fallacy
According to the nullification fallacy statistically non-
significant findings will be interpreted as evidence of no
effect and therefore the effect size should be rated as ap-
proximately zero. We found that only a minority of our
participants specified the mean difference or Cohen’s d
as exactly zero (6% in ‘thermometer’- study, and 3% in
locomotion study, respectively). However, a large pro-
portion of participants thought that an effect in a non-
significant study is very small (59% in the ‘thermometer’-
study, and 60% in the ‘locomotion’-study; cf. Figure 2).
Table 3 shows the exact distribution in terms of d values:
as can be seen, non-significant studies were considered to
have very small or small effects, whereas significant stud-
ies were estimated as more diverse: very small as well as
large effects were estimated. In sum, although most partic-
ipants did not specify the difference between the two
means, or Cohen’s d, as exactly zero, they guessed that sta-
tistically non-significant findings might also be of low
practical significance.sig.
60% 0% 20% 40% 60%
Proportion of estimates
all (0.00 < d < 0.30), small (0.30 < d < 0.50), medium (0.50 < d <
Table 3 Crosstabulation of estimated Cohen’s d for significant and non-significant condition for both studies
Category Thermometer study Locomotion study
‘Significant’ (n = 53) ‘Non-significant’ (n = 73) ‘Significant’ (n = 65) ‘Non-significant’ (n = 68)
Large (d > 0.80) 17 (30%) 7 (9%) 24 (37%) 11 (16%)
Medium (0.50 < d < 0.80) 12 (15%) 7 (9%) 19 (29%) 4 (6%)
Small (0.30 < d < 0.50) 8 (23%) 16 (22%) 13 (20%) 12 (18%)
Very small (0.00 < d < 0.30) 16 (30%) 43 (59%) 9 (13%) 41 (60%)
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This study tested two fallacies associated with statistical
significance: the magnitude fallacy and the nullification
fallacy. According to the magnitude fallacy results ac-
companied by low p values are interpreted as having a
higher effect size than results with higher p values. Effects
of non-significant results will, according to the nullifica-
tion fallacy, be interpreted as evidence of no or a negli-
gible effect.
We found that significant results were rated to have
higher effect sizes compared to non-significant results.
In contrast, sample sizes were not rated higher in the
significant condition. That is, in the formula p = f (ES, N)
only the effect size seems to be considered, but not the
sample size. This could indicate that students assumed
that the presented studies have used power analysis to
attain the adequate sample size for their experiments.
In power analysis the relationship between effect size
and samples size is optimized: sample sizes are chosen
to be ‘big enough’ so that an effect of such magnitude
as to be of scientific significance will also be statistically
significant, but sample sizes will not be ’too big’, so that
an effect of little scientific importance is not statistically
detectable [55,56]. However, power surveys of psycho-
logical articles reveal again and again (e.g., [57-63]) that
the probability of finding a significant effect of medium
effect size (i.e., r = .30, d = .50) is in the range of 0.40–
0.60. This implies that the ‘optimal’ sample size is rarely
calculated. Note also that power analysis is virtually
never reported in journal articles as has been shown in
a current review [64] that assessed and reanalysed report-
ing practices of over 6000 educational and psychological
articles. This neglect of power is not surprising given that
the concept of power arose out of the Neyman-Pearson
approach of hypotheses testing which seems to be very
seldom used [65].
However, even if researchers (and teachers) fail in using
power considerations in their research, it could still be
that students rely on power calculations, since this is what
they (at least our students) are told in their research
methods class. Frequently power considerations have been
part of the curricula in the last years, but these ideas seem
to meet with little love in current research. In any case, we
do not think that considerations of power are the basis for
expecting large effect sizes for significant findings.It is one important feature of our findings that students
estimated effect sizes to be different for significant and
non-significant findings. Notice that the significant condi-
tion was a description of the original study. Thus we can
see how close our participants’ estimates came to the
actual findings. In terms of Cohen’s d, participants did
not overestimate the effect size, not even in the signifi-
cant condition. Note, however, that the actual finding
of d = 0.75 in the thermometer study is a very impre-
cise estimate, with the 95% C.I. for d ranging from d =
0.05 to d = 1.46. Hardly any plausible positive effect size
estimate can be far off this value. For the locomotion
study this presumably also applies, but it is impossible
to calculate the exact 95% C.I. from the data due to the
within subjects design and the failure to report the cor-
relation between the conditions.
We found only partial support for the nullification fal-
lacy, that non-significant effects will be actually rated as
zero in effect size. Only few participants rated the effect
in the non-significant condition as exactly zero in size.
Practically, this expectation is highly unlikely in the first
place as students know that there is actually always a
difference in some decimal place between two sample
means (cf. the fallacy of soft psychology, [31]). However,
although the majority of participants did not predict an
effect size of exactly zero, they predicted a lion’s share of
negligible to small effects in the non-significant condition.
A comparison of estimated effect sizes in the signifi-
cant condition shows a striking difference: here mainly
medium to large effect sizes were predicted. People thus
do not nullify, they rather minimize. Further studies
should investigate the sources of these predictions more
thoroughly. For example, it could be important whether
or not the research hypothesis was perceived as plaus-
ible. Although we have not covered this topic in the
current studies, we assume that both research hypotheses
(temperature influences perception of social proximity,
physical inhibition transfers to cognitive processes) are
plausible. Plausibility will surely affect estimations of ef-
fect size, beyond significance. Sample size may be less
influenced by considerations of plausibility, however.
Estimating statistical values obviously was a very diffi-
cult task for participants. Note that we used students in
their statistics course as participants, and we incentivized
the task. Nevertheless, a good share of our participants
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those from our analysis. However, the remaining partici-
pants had also difficulties estimating some values, for in-
stance means, and, most notably, standard deviations.
This difficulty was most evident in the locomotion study,
where the estimates were far off. As it seems, estimating
such values is not part of their training in statistics. In
conjunction with a difficult dependent variable like reac-
tion time measured in milliseconds, this may render such
a task really difficult. However, getting a grasp on what
sample statistics mean, and what their plausible range can
be, is important for a thorough understanding of statistical
results. Therefore, tasks like ours can be used not only for
investigating statistical intuitions, but also for providing
training in these intuitions.
Conclusions
This study showed that students have a limited under-
standing of the underlying concepts of statistical inference.
Statistical and practical significance were not distinguished
properly. Since some of these students might be future re-
searchers this lack of understanding can have a colossal
impact on the whole research field [66]. Indeed, recent
analysis of effect size reporting practices found that dis-
crepancies between statistical and practical significances
were rarely discussed by the authors of articles [67,68].
But as Kline [16] pointed out, circulating misconceptions
like the magnitude fallacy may not be solely the fault
of users; rather the logical foundation of contemporary
NHST is not entirely consistent. To prevent future confu-
sion about statistical and practical significance effect sizes
should be routinely reported as recommended by the
major associations in psychology [69] and education [70].
The publication manual ([69], p. 34) states: ‘For the reader
to appreciate the magnitude or importance of a study’s
finding, it is almost always necessary to include some
measure of effect size in the results section.’ But as
Henson [71] clarified, a realisation thereof will need con-
tinued education and explication. Our findings testify to
this conclusion.
Our students tend to interpret the label ‘significant’ as
showing that a study found a nontrivial effect size, rather
than that it was large. This is legitimate, and therefore
not a fallacy proper. However, in many cases significance
is achieved through questionable research practices, among
which adaptive sampling (i.e., increasing sample size to
achieve significance) is a prominent one [72]. In addition,
there is a significant correlation between sample size and
effect size in psychological research [73], indicating that
significance is often due to large samples, rather than to
large effects. Our findings thus show that students still
believe in the seriousness of scientific conduct, and that sci-
entific journals are filled with papers that have substance in
a practical sense: we must not jeopardize this positive view.Appendix: Task description and instruction
Dear participant, thank you for taking part in our survey.
You will see descriptions of two scientific research papers
and we ask you to indicate your personal guess on several
features of these studies (sample size, p-value, …). It is im-
portant that you give your personal and intuitive estimates.
You must not be shy in delivering your estimates, even
if you are not sure at all. We are aware that this may be
a difficult task for you – yet, please try.
Task 1: The influence of warmth on social distance
In this study researchers investigated the influence of
warmth on social distance. The hypothesis was that
warmth leads to social closeness. There were two groups
to investigate this hypothesis:
Participants of group 1 held a warm drink in their hand
before filling in a questionnaire. Participants of group 2
held a cold drink in their hands before they filled in the
same questionnaire. Participants were told to think about
a known person and had to estimate their felt closeness
to this person. They had to indicate closeness on a scale
from 1–7, whereas 1 means ‘very close’ and 7 means
‘very distant’.
The closeness ratings of the participants of group 1
were then compared to the closeness ratings of group 2.
Researchers found a statistically significant [non-
significant] effect in this study.
Task 2: The influence of body movement on information
processing speed
Previous studies have shown that body movements can
influence cognitive processes. For instance, it has been
shown that movements like bending an arm for pulling
an object nearer go along with diminished cognitive con-
trol. Likewise, participants showed more cognitive con-
trol during movements pushing away from the body. In
this study, the influence of movement of the complete
body (stepping forward vs. stepping backward) on speed
of information processing was investigated.
The hypothesis was that stepping back leads to more
cognitive control, i.e., more capacity. There were two
conditions in this study: In the first condition partici-
pants were taking four steps forwards, and in the second
condition participants were taking four steps backwards.
Directly afterwards they worked on a test capturing
attention in which their responses were measured in
milliseconds. The mean reaction time of the stepping
forward-condition was compared to the mean reaction
time of the stepping backward-condition.
Researchers found a statistically significant [non-
significant] effect in this study.
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